This paper examines how government regulation in developing countries affects the form of corruption between business customers and service providers in the telecom sector. We match the World Bank enterprise-level data on bribes with a unique crosscountry telecom regulation dataset collected by Wallsten et al. (2004) , finding that (1) strong regulatory substance (the content of regulation) and regulatory governance reduce corruption; (2) competition and privatization reduces corruption; (3) the effects of regulatory substance on corruption control are stronger in countries with state-owned or partially state-owned telecoms, greater competition, and higher telecommunication fees; and (4) bureaucratic quality exert substitution effects to regulatory substance in deterring corruption. Overall, our results suggest that regulatory strategies that reduce information asymmetry and increase accountability tend to reduce illegal side-payments for connections.
Introduction
The telecommunications industry has become one of the fastest-growing industries in many developing countries. It is also believed to provide substantial positive externalities to other businesses (Li and Xu, 2002) . Röller and Waverman (2001) find that a country's economic growth is positively related to its telecommunications infrastructure. However, corporate corruption, among many challenges facing public service institutions by developing countries, is one of the most pervasive and difficult ones to deal with.
There is already a substantial literature on the determinants of corruption; 2 regulation is considered as an important factor that affects corruption (Stigler, 1971; Peltzman, 1976; Laffont and Tirole, 1991, 1993; Djankov, La Porta, López-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 2002) . However, in the telecommunications industry, corruption can take place in various forms, such as between telecommunications service providers and politicians, between telecom companies and the regulator, between telecom companies and companies from other sectors who want to obtain better services, and between service providers and service users (where the latter need to pay side-payments to get connected. Therefore, the effects of regulatory control on corruption may be different across different forms of corruption. For example, a regulator may have efficient control on service providers by controlling demand for bribes from customers; however, meanwhile service providers could use bribes to build up political ties in order to secure their profits despite the presence of a strict regulatory agency. In the former case, more regulation control is correlated with less corruption at the regulated firm level, but in the 2 See, for example, Treisman (2000) , Svensson, (2003) , Clarke and Xu (2004) , Aidt, Dutta, and Sena (2008) , Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (2006) , Fan, Lin, and Treisman (2009) , Barth, Lin, Lin, and Song (2009) and Anbarci, Escaleras, and Register (2009) . In addition, Dreher, Kotsogiannis, and McCorriston (2006) employ a structural model by treating corruption as a latent variable to derive an index of corruption. latter case, more regulation control could be correlated with more corruption at the political level. Recent work done by Estache and Wren-Lewis (2011) reviews the theories of corruption in regulated sectors and explains the many forms of corruption in sector governance and regulation. However, due to the complex relationships in the governance of telecommunications industry and associated data limitations for conducting studies, 3 there are still gaps in our empirical knowledge of these issues -to date, the impacts of government control on corporate corruption have rarely been empirically tested. In this paper, we aim to fill some gaps in the existing literature by focusing on whether the regulator as the third party can effectively limit the side-payments between telephone services providers and business customers.
Certainly, a well-designed regulatory system can enhance corporate governance of regulated firms (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine, 2006) and reduce their misconduct (such as fraud and requiring connection side-payments from their customers. If the government can create a countervailing institution which has the power to deter corruption and enforce penalties, regulatory control should be associated with less connection-facilitation payments. This outcome occurs because efficient regulatory control can provide credible threats to those service providers whose managers or installation staff request facilitation payments; at the same time, transparency promotes bargaining power for customers. Nonetheless, strong regulation may not necessarily reduce the demand for bribes because of the difficulty and complexity of combating this form of corruption. Especially in emerging countries, resource allocation is often shaped by political connection. Regulators with strong oversight powers may use their power to 3 Only a few studies have been performed, and these provide mixed evidence. For example, Djankov et al. (2002) find that countries with heavier regulation of entry (involving more procedures, costs, and delays in obtaining permission for entry) are associated with higher corruption levels. Beck et al. (2006) find that more supervisory power induces more corruption in bank lending while supervisory strategies that focus on forcing accurate information disclosure help reduce corruption in bank lending. Seim and Soreide (2009) find that corruption, when coupled with regulatory complexity, negatively affects performance in infrastructure sectors, including telecommunications. However, they use a general corruption index from the World Bank governance indicators, while we utilize micro-data from individual business users of telecommunications services -allowing more rigorous tests of the impacts of corruption.
induce noncompliant firms to divert resources to companies with political ties (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine, 2006; Emerson, 2006; Houston, Lin and Ma, 2011) . In such cases, the revenue sharing between politicians and utility companies may be catalysts for side-payments demand. As a result, it is important to know whether and to what extent regulatory control is efficient enough to control telecommunications connectionfacilitation payments.
To answer these questions, we examine two aspects of government regulation in this paper: regulatory governance and regulatory substance. Previous research usually focused on regulatory governance, which can be characterized by four elements:
independence of the regulator, clarity of responsibility, accountability, and transparency and participation (Stern and Holder, 1999; Gutièrrez, 2003) . The present study also considers regulatory substance indicators: standardized regulatory tariff setting, quality of service standards, sufficient (but not excessive) accounting professionals, and periodic review procedures. Regulatory governance refers to the institutional and legal design of the regulatory system and the creation of the regulatory framework within which decisions are made. Regulatory substance refers to the actual decisions made by the regulator. 4 The difference between regulatory substance and regulatory governance is that the former is the -what of regulation‖ and the latter is the -how of regulation.‖
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Including a variable for regulatory substance is important for analyzing the control of corruption because this variable captures the extent to which the regulator is able to establish a reasonable tariff level and has compliance procedures for a minimum service standard. Detailed standards leave less leeway for service providers to exercise discretion towards their customers. In addition, regulatory substance also indicates whether the regulatory agency has enough auditing resources for monitoring performance and is in a 4 Spiller (1994, 1996) use the term -regulatory incentives‖ to denote -substance.‖ 5 Executive Summary, Handbook for Evaluating Infrastructure Regulatory Systems, 2006, Ashley C. Brown, Jon Stern, and Bernard Tenenbaum with Defne Gencer, the World Bank, Washington, D.C., p.5 position to conduct investigations necessary for evaluating previous decisions. All these features are important if the regulator is to deter corruption. Therefore, we expect that strong regulatory substance is associated with less facilitation payments in the sector.
Our two measures of the regulatory system capture the actual operating procedures of regulatory agencies, distinguishing our research from previous empirical studies that focus solely on elements of regulatory governance. To our knowledge, this paper is the first one to quantify regulatory substance to test the effects of government regulation on perceived corporate corruption in the telecom sector.
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Our analysis uses the World Bank datasets (WBES and EECAS) that contain enterprise-level data on bribes paid to telecom utilities and a unique cross-country telecom regulation dataset collected by Wallsten et al. (2004) . Based on a sample of 3,731 firms in 26 transitional economies, we find strong evidence that both regulatory substance and regulatory governance reduce corporate corruption. We find competition reduces corruption and along another industry feature, state-owned telecoms are associated with more corruption. Furthermore, the effects of regulatory substance on corruption reduction are more pronounced in countries with more competition, less privatization and higher telecom fees. Our results suggest that regulatory strategies that reduce information asymmetry and increase accountability tend to reduce corruption.
Our study makes several contributions to the existing research. First, there is substantial literature on corruption in the public utility sector (e.g. Clarke and Xu, 2004; Dal Bó and Rossi, 2007; Vagliasindi, 2011);  7 we extend previous studies by providing 6 We use corporate corruption thereafter to refer to the particular form of corruption we examined in the paper, i.e., bribery and side-payments activities by private enterprises to telecom service providers; in some developing countries, telecommunications service is still owned or partially owned by the government, which we examine here. However, the main goal of this paper is to determine whether the regulator as the third party can effectively limit corruption between business customers and service providers. For example, Kenny (2009) argues that a separate -anticorruption agenda‖ in infrastructure reform may be misplaced: a broader agenda of improved governance simultaneously targets a wider range of issues (including transparency, professionalism, and citizen participation).
7 Clarke and Xu (2004) study how privatization and competition affect corruption in the telecom and electricity sector of developing countries. They find that increased competition, more expansive private ownership, and less stringent capacity constraints are associated with reduced corruption. Dal Bó and Rossi (2007) study 80 electricity firms from 13 Latin American countries and find that corruption in those countries is strongly associated with inefficiency within the industry. Vagliasindi (2011) uses case studies to compare performance between private and empirical evidence of how government regulation helps to curtail facilitation payments between customers and service providers during the process of regulatory reform. This is an important point because the weak sector performance that results from this type of corporate corruption not only limits access to telephony, hinders utility reforms, but also constrains private business growth and development (Estache, Goicoechea, and Trujillo, 2009 ). Second, our study contributes to the literature on the micro-based incentive study on firm corrupt behavior in emerging countries (Svensson, 2003; Clarke and Xu, 2004; Cai, Fang and Xu, 2011) . Third, we provide a quantitative study that complements the regulation literature examining the impacts of regulatory schemes on firm operations.
Previous studies find that regulatory schemes affect service quality (e.g. Ai and Sappington, 2005) , operating efficiency (e.g. Li and Xu, 2004; Berg, Lin and Tsaplin, 2005) , and the provision of public goods (Bose, Capasso, and Murshid, 2008) . We add to the existing literature by showing that regulatory schemes have significant effects on reducing the form of corruption that is associated with obtaining access to service.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents data and summary statistics. Section 3 presents empirical methodology and results. Section 4 discusses robustness checks. Section 5 provides some concluding observations.
Data
Our data come from three main sources: (1) In our sample, 35% of the firms are small firms (less than 10 employees), 10% are medium-sized (between 11 and 500 employees), and the remaining 55% are large firms (more than 500 employees). Most of the firms in the sample are from manufacturing (36%), service (45%), construction (10%), or agriculture (5%) sectors. To examine the relationship between regulation and bribery extracted from their business customers by managers of regulated firms (or their installation personnel), we employ firm-level data.
We also control for a range of firm-specific and country-specific characteristics.
Dependent Variable: Corruption
The dependent variable, Corruption, is constructed based on the answers to the question -Do firms like yours typically need to make extra, unofficial payments to service providers to get connected to telephone?‖ in the WBES and EECAS surveys.
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The answers to this question captures the frequency of bribery, including -never,‖ about the same time as the WBES survey in 1999-2000. Also, since early 1990s, an increasing number of developing countries started their regulatory reforms, which provides an ideal opportunity to identify variations in regulatory policies across countries. 10 We exclude countries that have less than 10 firm observations. 11 The EECAS survey is conducted by the World Bank, which uses essentially the same questionnaire, and contains more Eastern European and Central Asian firms.
-seldom,‖ -sometimes,‖ -frequently,‖ -mostly‖ and -always‖ in the survey.
12 To reduce the possibility of idiosyncratic firm responses, we code the answers as -1=never, 2=seldom, sometimes, frequently, or mostly and 3=always.‖ 13 Overall, 62.2% of the firms in the sample report that they never make extra, unofficial payments to public officials to get connected to telephone, 5.2% of firms report that they always pay unofficial payments to the service providers, the rest of firms report they pay bribes with frequencies from seldom to mostly. The average frequencies of bribes for each country are shown in Table 1 (column 3). We compare the calculated aggregate frequencies of bribes with the Transparency International Global Corruption Perception Index (GCPI) in Figure 1 . Since the GCPI ranges between 1 and 6, with higher value indicating less corruption and our frequencies of bribes are measured with higher value indicating more corruption, we find a negative correlation between these two indexes, suggesting that our measure of country level corruption is consistent with Transparency International. We calculate the overall standard deviation of the Corruption variable, which is 0.59, and the between-country standard deviation and within-country standard deviation, which are 0.32 and 0.50, respectively. 14 Since the mean of Corruption is 1.43, the differences in standard deviations imply that the frequencies of bribes vary not only across countries but also across firms within countries. 12 We dropped those firms that do not answer this question or respond -I don't know.‖ 13 In our previous version of working paper, we have coded the answers as -1 = never, 2 = seldom, 3 = sometimes, 4 = frequently, 5 = mostly and 6 = always,‖ and all the empirical results are consistent with the current ones. 
Explanatory Variables
The main explanatory variables are measures of (1) regulation systems, including regulatory governance and regulatory substance; (2) whether the operators are stateowned, partially state-owned, or fully privatized; (3) level of competition in local telephone service, and (4) the tariff level (including the installation fee and subscription fee). Appendix Table 1 provides detailed definitions for all the variables used throughout the paper. Figure 2 below illustrates the theoretical links among the factors that could affect perceived bribery. The expected signs for these factors are discussed later. First, we specify how to construct variables for these factors. 
Regulatory substance
Drawing upon Spiller's (1994, 1996) It is also important for regulators to set a minimum service standard that the utility providers are expected to meet (Brown et al. 2006) . If the regulator can determine detailed standards for the regulated companies, make both consumers and investors aware of the nature of the service, and if the prices are set at reasonable levels, service providers will be less able to exercise discretion towards their customers, and bribes should be less frequent. Therefore, as a proxy for quality of service standard we use information on whether key performance data (i.e., call completion rates by operator, faults and faults repair, and geographical coverage rates) are collected.
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Audits can provide valuable information to regulators. However, developing countries often lack reliable accounting and auditing systems (Laffont, 2005) . This is often due to a limited number of accounting employees; therefore, to create a measure of a regulatory agency's accounting resources, we scaled the number of accountants employed by the regulator by the annual revenues of the country's telecommunications industry (in U.S. dollars). To avoid a downwards bias of this ratio for countries with large telecommunications sectors, a value of -1‖ is given for the country with the maximum of this ratio, which is in Honduras (0.0869). For the other countries, the above calculated ratio is divided by 0.0869. This yields a proxy variable corresponding to the Accountants
Ratio.
Periodic regulatory review is a necessary procedure if the agency is to evaluate previous decisions and incorporate performance indicators into rate reviews. Performing such routine regulatory functions reduces regulatory discretion and puts a spotlight on managerial behavior. It can also reduce undue discrimination toward consumers and limit abusive business practices (including bribery requests). We use the answer to the question -whether there is a set period of time between regulatory reviews‖ as a measurement for Periodic Review. The correlation matrices for elements of this index are presented in Table 3 . The country-level relationship between the regulatory substance index and the bribe frequencies is plotted in Figure 3 .
The pattern clearly shows that frequencies of bribes are lower in countries with stricter regulatory substance. We discuss the empirical analysis results in detail in section 3. 
Fitted values
Note: WBES Frequencies of Corruption is coded between 1 and 3, with 1= Never, 2=Seldom, Sometimes, Frequently, or Mostly, 3=Always, based on answers to the question -Do firms like yours typically need to make extra, unofficial payments to service providers to get connected to telephone?‖
Regulatory governance
We incorporate regulatory governance into the analysis by utilizing four elements:
Independence of the Regulator, Clarity of Responsibility, Accountability, and
Transparency and Participation. According to Stern (1994) , Stern and Holder (1999) and Gutièrrez (2003) , telecommunications regulation is far more credible in countries where regulatory governance is characterized by these four elements.
We follow the above literature to construct each regulatory governance variable by applying the same weight to each survey question. Compared with the regulatory substance index, the regulatory governance index is higher by about 20 percentage points on average. The difference in absolute value is largely caused by the small average value for the Accountants Ratio. To make the marginal effects comparable, section 3 will compare marginal effects based on a one standard deviation change rather than the marginal effects based on actual level changes.
Tariff Level, State Ownership and Competition
Several other country-level variables are also included. First, we include a Fee variable as a control variable to measure tariff level, which is calculated by the sum of the monthly subscription fee and installation fee scaled by the monthly GDP per capita. 19 The range of the Fee variable in our sample is quite large, from 0.0001 to 1.7771. Tariffs are a critical element of telecommunications service providers; they provide price signals to consumers, determine access to service, affect the financial sustainability of firms, and reflect the extent to which competitive pressures or regulatory requirements limit abovenormal profits. However, the price of services is difficult to evaluate in the context of corruption. We expect that tariff level is positively associated with frequencies of bribery for the following reasons: First, the high tariff level could be due to high service costs, which leads to low rents for telecommunications service providers. In this case, the service providers are more likely to seek extra payments to defray their high costs (or to allow installation staff to extract rents). Furthermore, if the installation fee is very high but the service quality is poor, the combination might cause users to make extra payments to the telecom provider to repair their telephone systems: users have already paid installation fees, and the incremental bribery payments are low relative to incremental benefits. Second, it is also possible that the high price of telecom service is associated with high rents to the service provider. By 2004 (when the survey was taken) telephone service was still limited in many developing countries, due to technological limitations (line-line rather than mobile phones) or affordability issues. In those areas, telephone service consumption is like a luxury good -enabling service providers to request side payments for trivial services, even when those services may be costless (such as connecting multiple phones on one line).
We also include telecoms' ownership and competition in our analysis since, as 
Other Firm-specific Characteristics and Country-level Control Variables
Firm-specific control variables, which are derived from the WBES/EECAS survey questions, include firm ownership, firm size, sector, etc. We expect a firm's ownership to affect utility bribe payments, though there are some counteracting forces: private firms tend to have less political influence than government-owned firms, so they might be less able to resist bribe demands ; on the other hand, small business firms are likely to suffer from cash flow problems, which reduce their ability to pay bribes ; firms from different sectors have different valuations of (and demands for) telecom service and thus may exhibit different frequencies of paying bribery, holding everything else constant. We also include export as a dummy variable:
this takes on the value of one if the firm exports, and zero otherwise. An export-oriented firm will place a particularly high value on telecommunications services.
In addition, we control for many country-specific attributes, including the logarithm of GDP per capita, the logarithm of population, GDP growth, inflation level,
and Urban Share (Urban population as a percentage of total population) as they may reflect the potential gain to business customers from having a working phone system.
Willingness to pay for service translates into a willingness to pay bribes.
Estimation

Baseline Regression
Due to the discrete nature of the dependent variable, we mainly use an ordered probit model in our regression analysis. We also compute heteroskedastic robust standard errors clustered at the country level to allow the errors to be correlated within countries.
We first report results for regressions that include regulatory substance index (columns 1-2 of Table 4 -A) and regulatory governance index (column 3 of Table 4 -A), respectively.
We then include both of the indexes together (column 4 of Note: The regressions are run based on ordered probit model, which is based on standard maximum likelihood estimation. The dependent variable "Corruption" is based on answers to the question -Do firms like yours typically need to make extra, unofficial payments to service providers to get connected to telephone? (1 = never, 2 = seldom, sometimes, frequently, mostly and 3 = always). Regressions include six dummies for firm size based upon employment and five dummies based upon sector of operations -manufacturing; agriculture, construction, service, and other. All the other variables are defined in Appendix Table 1 . Standard errors are in parentheses. Standard errors are Huber-White standard errors allowing firms' error terms within country to be correlated for regressions. i.e., clustered errors at the country level. * significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level.
In order to demonstrate the magnitude of the effectiveness of regulatory policies on corruption control, we further compute the marginal effects of regulation on the probabilities that firms choose each of the three corruption levels (from -never‖ to -always‖). For this, we use the coefficient estimates from the model that includes both regulation indexes, i.e. regression (4) in Table 4 -A. Table 4 -B presents the marginal effects for an -average‖ enterprise. As we noted earlier, to make the marginal effects comparable, we compare marginal effects based on a one standard deviation change rather than the marginal effects based on actual level changes. We also report impacts if the variable changes from the minimum value to the maximum value. As can be seen, the magnitudes of the economic impacts are quite large.
For instance, the estimated results suggest that a one standard deviation increase in the regulatory substance index would lead to a 17.54 percentage point decrease in the probability that a firm reports that it needs to pay the additional unofficial payments with frequencies ranges between never and always. If the regulatory substance index increases from the minimum to maximum in the sample, the probability that a firm reports such payment decreases by 43.74 percentage points. The effects are substantial, since about 33% of the firms in the sample report that they need to pay side payments in the middle range of frequencies (between never and always), while about 60% of the firms say they do not need to bribe the telecom service providers.
Similarly, the estimates imply that a one standard deviation increase in the regulatory governance index value would lead to an 8.51 percentage point decrease in the probability that a firm reports it needs to pay the additional unofficial payments from seldom to mostly. If the regulatory governance index increases from the minimum to maximum in the sample, the probability that a firm reports such payment decreases by 29.95 percentage points. The results show that overall, regulatory substance has a strong effect in controlling for corruption: an impact often ignored in earlier research. 20 It is not intuitively obvious why regulation has a greater impact on corruption control when bribery happens in the middle range of frequencies rather than always. One reason could be that the benefits for those firms that need to pay side payments are marginal. If the regulatory intervention is effective in controlling bribery, top executives of firms supplying telecommunications services will be more likely to develop mitigation programs that reduce extortion and bribes: the risk of penalties from bribery might outweigh the benefits service providers can obtain. 21 If these benefits accrue to installers or other labors, then higher level managers might be engaging in more active prevention programs in those situationshaving an impact on the margin.
Tables 4-A and 4-B also present other important findings. First, the regression results often predict reduced bribery in the presence of privatization and competition. This is consistent with Clarke and Xu's (2004) findings. Second, the tariff level (Fee) enters positive and is statistically significant in all regressions. This result supports our previous conjecture that high tariff levels tend to be associated with more bribery. Third, the firm and country control variables yield some interesting results, too. In all specifications, government-owned firms purchasing telecommunications services are less likely to pay bribes than their privately owned counterparts. Other things equal, government-owned firms are more likely to say that they never need to do so. This finding suggests that in developing countries, private firms are much more vulnerable to unofficial payment requests than government-owned firms. It seems that state-owned customers have -protection‖ stemming from their connections to powerful ministries.
This result also suggests that justice is not practiced in an even-handed fashion in developing and transitional economies. In addition, the coefficients on the GDP growth are positive and statistically significant in most of the models for the frequencies of bribery, suggesting that firms in countries with higher GDP growth report more exposure to bribery, due to the fact that telecom service in those countries may be more valuable than in other countries.
In summary, the preliminary results indicate that a regulatory environment featuring strong regulatory governance and substance reduces corporate corruption in the telecom sector. The effect of regulation on corruption control is not only statistically significant, but also economically relevant; furthermore, the econometric model fits the data well. In terms of the fit, the Pseudo R 2 stays over 10%, which is high for these types of cross-firm empirical studies (Beck et al., 2006) . Tables 4-A Table 2 replicates the regression in Table 4 -A using the ordinary least square (OLS) model.
Different Categorizations for Corruption
To reduce the possibility that idiosyncratic firm responses will bias our results since the answers across each category are unbalanced (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine, 2006) , we use the dummy variable to represent corruption (-0‖ if -never‖ is being answered on perceived corruption and -1‖ if otherwise) and probit model to repeat the entire analysis. The probit regression results are presented in Table 5 (column 1-2). 22 We also present our results for using six categories of corruption and ordered probit model in column 3-4 of Table 5 . For all these regressions, we control for firm size and industry dummies. The impacts of regulatory substance and regulatory governance remain negative and statistically significant after we use different categorizations for corruption, suggesting that our main results are robust to different categorizations of bribe frequencies. 22 To further alleviate this concern, we use probit models to repeat all the ordered probit analysis in the paper, we do not find any inconsistent results. Following Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (2006), we also omitted each country one-at-a-time and we do not find that firm responses from a single country drive the results. These results are not reported due to space limitations; they are available from the authors upon request. (2) are run based on probit model, with dependent variable equals to zero if the answer is -never‖ to the question -Do firms like yours typically need to make extra, unofficial payments to service providers to get connected to telephone?, and one if otherwise. Regressions (3)-(4) are run based on ordered probit model, which is based on standard maximum likelihood estimation. The dependent variable "Corruption" is based on answers to the above question with 1 = never, 2 = seldom, 3 = sometimes, 4 = frequently, 5 = mostly and 6 = always. All regressions include six dummies for firm size based upon employment and five dummies based upon sector of operations -manufacturing; agriculture, construction, service, and other. All the other variables are defined in Appendix Table 1 . Standard errors are Huber-White standard errors allowing firms' error terms within country to be correlated for regressions. i.e., clustered errors at the country level. * significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level.
Controlling for Other Macro Country-Level Variables
A large body of research has examined the effects of country-level variables on corruption. Even though most of these variables are not expected to affect corporate corruption in the utility sector, they may affect overall country level corruption, which could indirectly affect the utility corruption . To the extent that some of the unobservable elements can be correlated with country-level variables, excluding them could cause omitted variable bias. To check this, we utilize data from the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) project related to political rights and democracy; in addition, we also added government spending and the ratio of fuel, ore and metal exports to GDP, respectively, to the base regression, i.e., regression (4) of Table 4 -A (Appendix Table 1 contains detailed definitions). The results for coefficient estimation are presented in Table 6 . The coefficients on these control variables are all statistically significant. The main results for regulatory substance and regulatory governance remain negative and statistically significant even after the inclusion of these variables. Overall, firms have less frequency to pay bribes in countries with better political rights, more natural resource exports, a higher democracy level, and greater government expenditures.
Controlling for Institutional Environment
Another source of omitted variable bias might come from characteristics of the institutional environment. As pointed out by Beck et al. (2006) The regressions are run with ordered probit, which is based on standard maximum likelihood estimation. The dependent variable "Corruption" is based on answers to the question -Do firms like yours typically need to make extra, unofficial payments to service providers to get connected to telephone? (1 = never, 2 = seldom, sometimes, frequently, mostly and 3 = always). Regressions include six dummies for firm size based upon employment and five dummies based upon sector of operations -manufacturing; agriculture, construction, service, and other. All the other variables are defined in Appendix Table 1 . Standard errors are Huber-White standard errors allowing firms' error terms within country to be correlated for regressions. i.e., clustered errors at the country level. * significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level.
To control for the country's institutional environment, we further include a series of political and institutional quality indices -the World Governance Indices (WGI). The WGI (Kaufmann et al., 2006) which measures bureaucratic quality; (4) Regulatory Quality, which measures policy implementation ability; (5) Rule of Law, which measures law enforcement and legal system efficiency; and (6) Control of Corruption, which measures the extent to which public power can resist corruption. 23 The results for coefficient estimation are presented in Table 7 . Again, the coefficients are consistent with our previous results: both regulatory governance and regulator substance have negative signs in all regressions, and almost all of them are statistically significant at the 1% level. Moreover, all the estimated coefficients of WGI variables are negative and statistically significant, suggesting that a better general institutional environment lowers the degree to which firms have to bribe the telecom sector to obtain service.
Endogeneity and Instrumental Variable (IV) Estimation
Although our results so far have just shown a correlation between corruption and regulation, the causal effect is more likely to run from better regulation to less corruption since it is hard to argue that an individual firm's views about corruption will influence a country's telecom regulatory policies. Nonetheless, there may still be a feedback effect running from the private sector to the regulatory authorities: a high level of corporate corruption may lead to pressure for more effective regulation (Beck et al. 2006) . We use instrumental variable estimation to address this endogeneity concern.
23 Appendix Table 1 defines these variables in detail. The regressions are run with ordered probit, which is based on standard maximum likelihood estimation. The dependent variable "Corruption" is based on answers to the question -Do firms like yours typically need to make extra, unofficial payments to service providers to get connected to telephone? (1 = never, 2 = seldom, sometimes, frequently, mostly and 3 = always). Regressions include six dummies for firm size based upon employment and five dummies based upon sector of operations -manufacturing; agriculture, construction, service, and other. All the other variables are defined in Appendix Table 1 . Standard errors are Huber-White standard errors allowing firms' error terms within country to be correlated for regressions. i.e., clustered errors at the country level. * significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level.
In particular, we use the absolute value of a country's latitude, financial depth, ideologies of voters, checks and balances in the governance, and ideological polarization as instrumental variables (IVs). We chose the absolute value of a country's latitude as our instrumental variable based on the recent research building on endowment theory, which focuses on the roles of geography, culture, and the disease environment in shaping institutional development (Easterly and Levine, 1997; Beck et al., 2003) . The variable has also been used in recent corruption studies as instrumental variables of regulation and institutions (e.g. Beck et al., 2006; Houston et al., 2011) . The basic idea of including the absolute value of a country's latitude as an instrumental variable is that European colonization shapes the country institutions and policy systems, and as Beck et al. (2006) have argued that European tendency to extracting natural resources generates more powerful administrative structures. Since Europeans usually do not settle in tropical climates, more temperate climates are usually associated with more European settlers and more egalitarian policies.
Based on the work by Li and Xu (2002) , who study the determinants of telecommunications sector reforms, we use some of the special determinants that affect telecommunications regulation but otherwise do not affect corruption perception for nontelecommunications companies as our other instrumental variables. These include financial depth, ideologies of voters, checks and balances in the government, and ideological polarization. The variables have been shown to be important determinants of privatization and competition in the telecommunications sector. The detailed definitions are shown in Appendix Table 1 . We argue that it is also reasonable to use them to instrument the regulation index because privatization, competition and regulation are inter-related policies in regulatory reforms. Based on Li and Xu's (2002) argument, the ideas for using these variables as IVs are as follows: (1) Businesses that rely heavily on the telecommunications services are the main beneficiaries of regulatory policy reforms.
Among businesses, the financial service sector is one of the largest users of such services. Therefore, countries with relatively large financial sectors are more likely to implement reforms in the telecommunications sector; (2) Ideologies of voters and politicians can help explain regulatory changes (Kalt and Zupan, 1984) . In particular, parties with different ideologies may prefer divergent policies; for example, right-wing parties are more likely to make regulatory reforms (though crony capitalism can limit these reforms);
and (3) Countries with more checks and balances can have some veto players who are in a position to block regulatory reforms more effectively.
Before we show our two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimation results, it is worth noting that, given the different context of our paper, the IVs we borrow may not totally eliminate the endogeneity bias here. It is plausible that some of the IVs may affect corruption directly rather than through regulation. For example, different ideological inclinations are more likely in democratic countries, and democracy is also considered as a determinant of corruption. Without good ideas of to what extent such direct correlations may contaminate the 2SLS estimates, we tend to interpret our 2SLS results as merely a sensitivity test rather than the true causal effects of regulation on corruption. Table 8 reports results from 2SLS estimation based on specification as in regression (4) of Table 4 -A. The F-statistics in the first stage indicate that the coefficients on the instruments are significantly different from zero at the 1% level. The overidentifying restrictions are not rejected at any significance level (1%, 5% or 10%) for all specifications. The R-square in the first stage estimation is above 95%, suggesting a good model of fit. After the instrumentation, the key explanatory variables -regulatory governance and substance -and other explanatory variables all remain the same signs.
There are no significant changes from the 2SLS estimation, suggesting that our main analysis does not suffer from serious endogeneity bias. The regressions are run with instrumental variables based on standard maximum likelihood estimation. The instruments in are the absolute value of a country's latitude, financial depth, ideologies of voters, checks and balances in the governance, and ideological polarization. The dependent variable "Corruption" is based on answers to the question -Do firms like yours typically need to make extra, unofficial payments to service providers to get connected to telephone? (1 = never, 2 = seldom, sometimes, frequently, mostly and 3 = always). Regressions include six dummies for firm size based upon employment and five dummies based upon sector of operations -manufacturing; agriculture, construction, service, and other. All the other variables are defined in Appendix Table 1. * significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level.
Nonlinear Effects -Interaction Analysis
In Table 9 , we include interaction terms to test whether the effects of regulatory substance vary by other country-level variables. 24 More specifically, in regression (1) - (6) of Table 9 , we add the interaction between regulatory substance and state-owned dummy variable (column 1), interaction between regulatory substance and partially state-owned dummy variable (column 2), both regulatory substance and the state ownership interaction terms (column 3), interaction between regulatory substance and competition (column 4), interaction between regulatory substance and the tariff level (Regulation*High Fee) 25 (column 5), and interaction between regulatory substance and government effectiveness (column 6).
We find that (1) the effects of regulatory substance on corruption are more significant in countries with state-owned or partially state-owned telecoms; (2) the effects of regulatory substance on corruption control are more pronounced within competitive telecommunications markets; (3) an extremely low price for telecom service may provide substantial financial leeway for firms to pay extra money (via bribery) even in the absence of effective regulatory substance; and (4) the country's government effectiveness serves as a substitute for regulatory substance as a deterrence to corporate corruption.
These findings are important as they suggest that the government and private sector should work together to create a more efficient regulatory framework, a competitive market with reasonable prices, in order to reduce telecom sector facilitation payment issues that hinders firm operations and artificially limits growth potential. 24 We searched the literature and to our best knowledge, the econometric estimators for calculating the marginal effects of interaction terms in the full value range of covariates have not been developed for ordered probit models. Although we use non-linear model here, a linear model would yield similar quantitative results as we show in Appendix Table 2 that the results for both models without interactions are very similar for our sample. Given the concern of interpreting the results for interaction terms in non-linear models, we confirm all our findings with OLS regressions and we find that the interaction effects using ordered probit model are consistent with those using OLS model. These results are not reported in the paper but available from the author upon request. 25 We define High Fee =1 if the tariff level is above the medium of the overall sample, and 0, otherwise. The regressions are run with ordered probit, which is based on standard maximum likelihood estimation. The dependent variable "Corruption" is based on answers to the question -Do firms like yours typically need to make extra, unofficial payments to service providers to get connected to telephone? (1 = never, 2 = seldom, sometimes, frequently, mostly and 3 = always). Regressions include six dummies for firm size based upon employment and five dummies based upon sector of operations -manufacturing; agriculture, construction, service, and other. High Fee =1 if the tariff level is above the medium of the overall sample, and 0, otherwise. All the other variables are defined in Appendix Table 1 . Standard errors are Huber-White standard errors allowing firms' error terms within country to be correlated for regressions. i.e., clustered errors at the country level. * significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level.
Conclusions
Using the World Bank datasets (WBES and EECAS) covering enterprise-level data on bribes paid to telecom utilities, and a unique cross country telecom regulation dataset collected by Wallsten et al. (2004) , this paper examines how government regulation affects corporate corruption in the telecom sector. We find strong evidence that both regulatory substance and regulatory governance reduce corruption. In addition, we find that competition has positive effects on corruption control but state-owned telecoms have negative effects on corruption reduction; the effects of regulatory substance on corruption control are stronger in countries with more competition, state-owned or partially stateowned telecoms and higher telecom fees; finally, government effectiveness exert substitution effects to regulatory substance in deterring corruption.
Many empirical studies do not incorporate regulatory substance effects due to the difficulty of obtaining comparable data on policies. This study provides a starting point for evaluating the regulatory substance effects on corruption. The research both constructs and utilizes an index based on information on tariff setting, accountants' ratio, quality of service standards, and periodic reviews. Future research could enhance this index by incorporating more comprehensive indicators of the accounting system. Furthermore, an evaluation of how each component of a regulatory system affects sector outcomes would also be interesting.
If new national regulatory systems cannot promote good outcomes within infrastructure sectors, the agencies will lose political legitimacy and investor credibility; their efficacy will be called into question. Therefore, the ultimate goal for policymakers is not a specific set of institutional features, but a sustainable system which can convince investors (both equity owners and bond-holders) that service providers have the opportunity to earn profits on investments (commensurate with risks) and also assure consumers that the industry is providing service improvements at affordable prices.
Processes that increase transparency and citizen participation are more likely to address perceived problems (like bribery) than regulatory agencies which lack professionalism or are not interested in promoting citizens' confidence in the entire governance system. The regressions are run based on ordinary least square estimation (OLS). The dependent variable "Corruption" is based on answers to the question -Do firms like yours typically need to make extra, unofficial payments to service providers to get connected to telephone? (1 = never, 2 = seldom, sometimes, frequently, mostly and 3 = always). Regressions include six dummies for firm size based upon employment and five dummies based upon sector of operations -manufacturing; agriculture, construction, service, and other. All the other variables are defined in Appendix Table 1 . Standard errors are in parentheses. Standard errors are Huber-White standard errors allowing firms' error terms within country to be correlated for regressions. i.e., clustered errors at the country level. * significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level.
